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Research indicates that there are two possible mechanisms by which particular
target memories can be intentionally forgotten. Direct suppression, which involves
the suppression of the unwanted memory directly, and is dependent on a fronto-
hippocampal modulatory process, and, memory substitution, which includes directing
one’s attention to an alternative memory in order to prevent the unwanted memory
from coming to mind, and involves engaging the caudal prefrontal cortex (cPFC) and
the mid-ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) regions. Research to date, however, has
investigated the neural basis of memory suppression of relatively simple information. The
aim of the current study was to use fMRI to identify the neural mechanisms associated
with the suppression of autobiographical memories. In the present study, 22 participants
generated memories in response to a series of cue words. In a second session,
participants learnt these cue-memory pairings, and were subsequently presented with
a cue word and asked either to recall (think) or to suppress (no-think) the associated
memory, or to think of an alternative memory in order to suppress the original memory
(memory-substitution). Our findings demonstrated successful forgetting effects in the
no-think and memory substitution conditions. Although we found no activation in
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, there was reduced hippocampal activation during
direct suppression. In the memory substitution condition, however, we failed to find
increased activation in the cPFC and VLPFC regions. Our findings suggest that the
suppression of autobiographical memories may rely on different neural mechanisms to
those established for other types of material in memory.
Keywords: think/no-think, memory retrieval, direct suppression, fMRI, autobiographical memories
INTRODUCTION
Remembering past events is something we all engage in. While such recollections are for the
most part enjoyable, there are some occasions when we might prefer not to bring them to mind.
Traumatic or upsetting events in one’s lives often tend to be associated with negative feelings
and emotions which we would prefer to avoid. Thus, the ability to expel upsetting memories
from conscious awareness confers obvious advantages for the rememberer. Recent psychological
research has sought to establish the extent to which we possess executive control over which
memories come to mind, and the mechanisms responsible. Using a wide range of materials, it is
now well-established that the repeated attempt to consciously forget unwanted memories impairs
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 379
fpsyg-07-00379 March 18, 2016 Time: 15:50 # 2
Noreen et al. Neural Correlates of Suppressing Autobiographical Memories
their subsequent recall, although debate continues about the
nature of the underlying mechanism responsible for such
forgetting (Anderson and Green, 2001; Anderson et al., 2004,
2011; Bergström et al., 2009; Hanslmayr et al., 2010; Noreen and
MacLeod, 2013, 2014, 2015; Noreen et al., 2014).
Most recently, this systematic forgetting effect has been
demonstrated during the retrieval of autobiographical memory –
memory for events that have been personally experienced
(Noreen and MacLeod, 2013, 2014; Stephens et al., 2013). Using
the autobiographical think/no-think task (ATNT), Noreen and
MacLeod (2013) asked participants to generate positive and
negative memories in response to a series of neutral cue words.
In a subsequent session, participants were asked to recall some of
the memories (‘think’ condition), or to avoid saying or thinking
about other memories (‘no-think’ condition). In a final test of
memory, participants who had been repeatedly instructed to ‘not
think’ about particular memories were found to have poorer
recall for details associated with these memories than baseline
memories that had not been the subject of either ‘think’ or
‘no-think’ instructions. Importantly, although participants still
remembered that the events had happened to them, systematic
forgetting effects emerged for details associated with those events
they had been instructed to prevent coming to mind.
These kinds of forgetting effects have been largely interpreted
within a suppression framework in which inhibitory control
is thought to disrupt the availability of the representation of
the unwanted memory, thereby rendering it inaccessible to
subsequent retrieval (Anderson and Green, 2001; Anderson,
2003; Anderson and Hanslmayr, 2014). Imaging studies have
allowed for greater speculation as to how this kind of inhibition
comes about. Specifically, Anderson et al. (2004) found that the
act of memory suppression engaged the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex [DLPFC; Brodmann area (BA) 46/9], plus a reduction in
activation in the hippocampus – a region thought to be involved
in conscious recollection (Eldridge et al., 2000; Eichenbaum et al.,
2007). Critically, this reduction in hippocampal activity during
attempts to suppress has not only been found when compared
to the ‘think’ condition, but also in comparison to the baseline
fixation condition (Depue et al., 2007; Levy and Anderson,
2012).
According to Anderson et al. (2004), hippocampal activity
is modulated by executive control via the DLPFC with
increased activation in this region being interpreted as an
active executive process that inhibits unwanted memories from
entering conscious awareness. In support of this notion, a
negative relationship has been found between activation in
the DLPFC and hippocampal activity during the ‘no-think’
condition (Depue et al., 2007, 2010; Benoit et al., 2014).
Furthermore, effective connectivity analyses have shown a top–
down modulatory influence of DLPFC on the hippocampus
(Benoit and Anderson, 2012; Gagnepain et al., 2014), with
negative coupling from the DLPFC predicting the magnitude
of the forgetting effect (Benoit and Anderson, 2012; Benoit
et al., 2014; Depue et al., 2016). Taken together, these findings
provide converging evidence in support of a direct suppression
mechanism which disengages retrieval processes supported by
the hippocampus.
There is, however, a growing appreciation that forgetting
effects for ‘no-think’ items are not always a function of inhibition.
For instance, an unwanted memory could be excluded from
conscious awareness by bringing an alternative memory to
mind; that is, blocking rather than suppression per se (Hertel
and Calcaterra, 2005). Indeed, some studies have shown that
suppression effects can be strengthened by using a strategy to
constrain attention (e.g., Hertel and Calcaterra, 2005; Hotta
and Kawaguchi, 2009; Joormann et al., 2009). Utilizing the
TNT paradigm, Hertel and Calcaterra (2005) demonstrated
higher levels of forgetting when participants were provided with
substitute words to think about instead of to-be-forgotten neutral
words, thereby suggesting that memory substitution may be a
useful strategy to help individuals to forget unwanted memories –
although such substitution may, under certain circumstances,
lead to hyperaccessibility of those memories one wishes to forget
(Wegner and Zanakos, 1994).
Recently, the neural mechanisms underlying memory
substitution have also come under scrutiny. Benoit and
Anderson (2012), for instance, asked some participants to think
of an alternative memory in order to help prevent an unwanted
memory from coming to mind, whilst others were asked to
directly ‘push’ the unwanted memory from conscious awareness.
Their study found that, whilst both groups demonstrated
comparable forgetting effects at final test, each condition
involved distinct neural networks. Consistent with previous
research, the direct suppression condition involved recruitment
of the right DLPFC region which exerted a negative influence
on hippocampal activation (Anderson et al., 2004). Memory
substitution, on the other hand, was found to engage the caudal
PFC (cPFC; approximating BA 44/9) and the mid-ventrolateral
PFC (mid-VLPFC; approximating posterior BA 45). These
two areas are thought to be involved in the retrieval of weaker
memories when faced with interference from stronger memories
(Wimber et al., 2008), and also during post-retrieval selection
between active memory representations (Badre and Wagner,
2007; Kuhl et al., 2008).
Furthermore, effective connectivity analyses revealed that,
in the direct suppression condition, the right DLPFC was
negatively coupled with the hippocampus whereas, in the
memory substitution condition, activation in the left cPFC and
mid-VLPFC predicted greater hippocampal activation during no-
think trials, suggesting that the hippocampus was recruited to
keep the substitute memory in mind (Benoit and Anderson,
2012). This would suggest that direct suppression and memory
substitution involve distinct neural networks that make different
processing demands on the hippocampus.
The interaction between the frontal and hippocampal
regions during suppression has been observed with a range
of materials (Anderson et al., 2004; Depue et al., 2007;
Butler and James, 2010; Levy and Anderson, 2012; Paz-
Alonso et al., 2013; Gagnepain et al., 2014). No research to
date, however, has examined whether this fronto-hippocampal
interaction extends to the direct suppression of autobiographical
memories. Furthermore, no research to date has explored
the neural mechanisms underpinning memory substitution for
autobiographical memories.
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These are important issues to explore given the highly complex
and personal nature of such memories. Autobiographical
memory is considered to be a unique form of memory that
enables the rememberer to make sense of the past. Indeed, such
memories tend to comprise mental constructions of experienced
events that are embedded in a rich context and are integrated with
the rememberer’s perspective, evaluation and interpretation that
serve to create a personal history (Conway, 2000).
Given the polylithic nature of autobiographical memories,
the kind of forgetting associated with such memories may be
inherently different from the kind of forgetting observed for other
materials. Consistent with this view, a number of recent studies
have found that, while participants systematically forget some
of the details related to autobiographical events in ‘no-think’
condition, the events themselves were not forgotten following
‘no-think’ instructions (Noreen and MacLeod, 2013, 2014;
Stephens et al., 2013). This suggests that different components
within a memory may be differentially susceptible to the effects
of suppression. This is in contrast to the kind of forgetting
observed for relatively simple words or images whereby the entire
representation of the unwanted memory trace appears to be
inhibited (Anderson and Green, 2001; Anderson et al., 2004;
Depue et al., 2007).
Additional support for the notion that the mechanism
underlying autobiographical memory suppression may be
different from the suppression of other kinds of memories
comes from recent research by Hu et al. (2015). In their
study, participants encoded memories by enacting a crime and
received instructions to suppress the memory of the crime
whilst EEG brain wave activity was recorded. Participants
also completed an autobiographical implicit association test.
Whilst suppression was found to reduce automatic cognitive
biases associated with autobiographical memories, the neural
signal in N200 was absent. Given that frontal N200 activity
is an electrophysiological marker of cognitive control that has
previously been found to be sensitive to suppression (Bergström
et al., 2009; Mecklinger et al., 2009), the failure to find activity
in the N200 region may indicate that the suppression of
autobiographical memories is not reliant on the same pattern
of fronto-hippocampal activation as the suppression of other
kinds of memories. According to Hu et al. (2015), one reason
for the failure in N200 activity may relate to the fact that
participants engaged in suppression continuously throughout
the memory task which may have made it more difficult to
detect suppression in a trial-specific manner. Thus, it remains
unclear as to whether the suppression of autobiographical
memories relies on the activation of a different neural pathway
or not.
In the present fMRI study, we set out to explore both direct
suppression and memory substitution mechanisms underlying
intentional forgetting using the ATNT task. Based on Noreen and
MacLeod (2013, 2014) findings, we predicted that participants
would show systematic forgetting effects for those details of
autobiographical memories which they had previously been
instructed to suppress (i.e., no-think condition). Additionally, we
expected similar forgetting effects to emerge where participants
had been encouraged to engage in thought substitution (Benoit
and Anderson, 2012). Our rationale for including both a
suppression and a thought substitution condition was to establish
whether the two separate systems previously identified during
the inhibition and substitution of relatively simple memories
extended to the retrieval of complex autobiographical memories.
We reasoned that, if memory suppression is not dependent upon
the type of material being suppressed then we could expect: (i) the
no-think condition to show increased activity in the right DLPFC
region exerting a negative influence on hippocampal activation;
and (ii) the memory substitution condition to show increased
activation in the cPFC and mid-VLPFC regions. If, however, the
suppression of autobiographical memories is unique to event-
specific personal memories, then we could expect our findings
to be consistent with those of Hu et al. (2015); that is, we could
expect to find no frontal activation during direct suppression.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
We initially had 34 participants (9 males; 25 females) attending
the University of St Andrews, Scotland (aged 18–29 years) agree
to take part in the study. We excluded 12 participants from the
study as they failed to generate memories for all of the cue words,
or had a history of, or were currently experiencing depression.
This resulted in 22 right-handed participants (4 males; 18
females) taking part in both sessions of the study between 7
and 14 days apart (mean number of days = 10). The study was
approved by the School of Psychology and Neuroscience Ethics
Committee of the University of St Andrews and NHS Tayside
Committee on Medical Research Ethics, Ninewells Hospital and
Medical School. Upon obtaining informed consent, participants’
eligibility to participate in the study was confirmed using a short
screening interview and a safety questionnaire routinely used by
anyone undergoing an MRI scan at Ninewells Hospital, Dundee,
UK. Participants were screened for current or previous history
of any psychological or neurological disorders, and current levels
of depressive symptomatology were measured using the Beck
Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II, Beck et al., 1996).
Procedure
Session One
The first session took place in the laboratories at the School
of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews,
and took approximately 2−3.5 h to complete. Participants
were presented with a series of 34 neutral words [taken from
Bradley and Lang, 1999; Affective Nouns for English Words
(ANEW)] which were matched for valence, arousal, dominance,
and frequency. Thirty words were used as cue words for the main
study and the four additional cue words were used as practice
trials in the second session. The 30 words used in the main study
were divided into five sets of six items (three positive and three
negative), with each set assigned to ‘think,’ ‘memory substitution,’
baseline,” and both ‘no-think’ conditions. The assignment of
each word to each condition was duly counterbalanced across
all participants. Participants were presented with a cue word
which was accompanied by a plus (+) or minus sign (−). When
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presented with a plus sign, participants were instructed to think
of a positive memory; and when presented with a minus sign,
participants were instructed to think of a negative memory.
Half the cue words were accompanied by a plus sign, and the
other half were accompanied by a minus sign. Participants were
given 2 min in which to generate a specific memory of an event
from any period of their life in response to the cue word. Once
participants had thought of a particular memory, they were given
1 min in which to describe the cause and the consequence(s) of
the event. All memory descriptions were recorded. Participants
were then asked to rate each memory regarding its perceived
valence (1 = very positive and 7 = very negative), availability
(1 = very easily and 7 = with difficulty), imaginability (1 = very
clearly and 7 = very vaguely), vividness (1 = very detailed and
7 = not detailed at all), and significance (1 = very significant
and 7 = very significant at all). Participants were also asked
to estimate their age at the time the event occurred. Finally,
participants were asked to rate how strongly they felt the memory
they had generated was associated with the cue word (1 = very
strongly and 7= not strongly at all). See Figure 1A.
Once a memory had been recalled for each of the cue words,
participants were told they would again see the same cue words,
but that their task this time would be to generate a second set
of memories. Participants were told that it was very important
that they retrieved a new memory which was independent of,
and unrelated to the first memory. For the generation of the
second set of memories, the cue words that had previously been
accompanied by a minus sign were accompanied by a plus sign to
indicate that they should recall a positive memory. Similarly, cue
words that had been previously accompanied by a plus sign were
accompanied by a minus sign to indicate that they should recall a
negative memory. Prior to Session Two, both sets of memories
(68 in total) were transcribed and coded by the experimenter
in relation to the perceived cause and consequence(s) of the
event.
Session Two
The second session took place at the Clinical Research
Centre, Ninewells Hospital, Dundee. The initial and final
phases of the study did not involve scanning and were
completed in a room with a computer in the Clinical
Research Centre. The main think/no-think phase, however,
involved the participant completing the task while being
scanned. The second session took approximately 3–4 h to
complete, with the main scanning session lasting approximately
28 min.
Learning phase (unscanned)
Participants were presented with a cue word for 60 s. As
soon as the cue word appeared on the computer screen,
participants were provided with a verbatim account of one
of the memories they had previously generated, and were
instructed to remember the details of that particular memory.
Half of the participants were presented with the first set of
memories generated in response to the cue words, and the
other half were presented with the second set of generated
memories. Regardless of the set of memories presented, all
participants learnt 15 positive and 15 negative memories.
A 500 ms inter-trial interval preceded the presentation of each
cue word.
Recall phase (unscanned)
Once all of the cue words had been presented, participants were
given a recall test. In this test, participants were presented with a
cue word for 10 s and instructed to press the spacebar as soon as
the associated memory from the learning phase came to mind.
Participants were then given 60 s in which to recall the cause
and the consequence(s) of the event. Feedback was provided on
the accuracy of the memory recalled. Regardless of accuracy,
participants were given 60 s to study the verbatim account of the
memory. All participants achieved a minimum of 85% on this
assessment.
Practice autobiographical think/no-think (ATNT) phase
(unscanned)
Once participants had learnt the cue-memory pairings, they were
told that they would see some of the cue words which would
be presented in either a red or green font. Green cue words
were accompanied by either the word ‘cause’ or ‘consequence’
and participants were told that their task was to think about
the particular aspect of the memory (i.e., ‘think’ condition). For
the red cue words, participants were told to not think about
the associated memory (i.e., ‘no-think’ condition). In order to
accomplish this, participants were told that they should block
the memory from coming to mind, but not by replacing it with
other memories or thoughts (Bergström et al., 2009). Two of the
filler cue words appeared in green (one presented four times, and
the other presented six times) and two filler cue words appeared
in red (one presented four times, the other presented six times),
thereby resulting in 20 practice trials in total.
Substitute learning phase (unscanned)
Immediately after the Practice ATNT phase, participants were
presented with six of the cue words, which were accompanied
by the second set of memories they had previously generated.
Participants were presented with each cue word for 60 s and
given a verbatim account of the new memory (i.e., the alternative
memory generated in the first session for that cue word) and were
told to try to remember all the details of that particular memory.
They were told to learn the pairing in whatever way they preferred
but to never think about the original memory.
Main autobiographical think/no-think phase (scanned)
Participants were then transferred to the fMRI scanner bed
where, after undergoing a series of structural scans (see fMRI
Acquisition and Preprocessing), they underwent the main ATNT
phase of the study whilst being scanned. Participants were given a
total of 288 experimental trials across four blocks which included
‘think’ and ‘no-think’ cue words in blocks 1 and 2 each being
presented 12 times and ‘no-think’ and ‘memory substitution’ cue
words in blocks 3 and 4 each being presented 12 times. In each
block, the 72 experimental trials (each consisting of a 4000 ms
presentation followed by an ISI of 500 ms) were intermixed with
18 passive fixation trials (4500 ms duration), yielding a total run
time of approximately 7 min for each block.
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Experimental procedure for session 1. (B) Experimental procedure for the ATNT task in session 2.
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The first two blocks consisted of 144 experimental trials
(72 ‘think’ trials and 72 ‘no-think’ trials) in which ‘think’ and
‘no-think’ trials were intermixed. Participants were given 12
presentations of six cue words from each of the ‘think’ and ‘no-
think’ conditions. For each trial, a cue appeared on the screen for
4000 ms in either green (‘think’) or red (‘no-think’) followed by an
ISI of 500 ms. For the ‘think’ trials, cue words were accompanied
by either the word ‘cause’ or ‘consequence’ and participants were
told that their task was to retrieve that particular aspect of the
memory (i.e., the cause or the consequence of the event) and
to keep it in mind for 4000 ms whilst focusing on the cue. For
the ‘no-think’ trials, participants attempted to keep the associated
memory out of consciousness, and to block it from coming to
mind whilst focusing on the cue word for 4000 ms.
Once the initial ATNT blocks had been completed,
participants remained in the scanner and received additional
instructions prior to undergoing two additional blocks of 72
trials (144 trials in total). The additional instructions informed
participants that they would now see cue words which would
be different from those presented in the first two blocks. They
were told that these words would be presented in either red
(‘no-think’) or blue (‘memory substitution’), with the blue cues
accompanied by the words ‘cause’ or ‘consequence.’ Participants
were told that, for the red cues, their task would be to do what
they had done in the previous blocks and attempt to keep the
associated memory out of consciousness whilst focusing on the
word. For the blue cues, their task was to again keep the original
learned memory from coming to mind but this time by thinking
of the new memory (i.e., the memory which participants had
learnt in the substitute learning phase), whilst paying attention
to, and looking at the cue word the entire time. Participants
were told that it was important to ensure they only used this
method to ‘not think’ about the original memories for the blue
and not the red cue words. The 144 additional trials comprised
12 presentations of six cue words in the second ‘no-think’
condition and six cue words in the ‘memory substitution’
condition1.
Final test phase (unscanned)
Once scanning had ended, participants were serially presented
with all the cue words and told to disregard all previous
instructions and to recall all of the associated memories in
as much detail as possible. To reduce output interference,
participants were told that, although they had learnt more than
one memory for some of the cue words, it was very important that
they recalled the original memory from the learning phase of the
experiment first and then the second memory if they remembered
it. Each cue word was presented for 30 s and participants were
asked to press the spacebar as soon as the associated memory
came to mind. Participants were then given 60 s in which to recall
the cause and the consequence(s) of the event. All memories
1It is important to mention here that the memory substitution and no-think trial
blocks were always presented after the no-think and think trial blocks. This was
to limit participant’s use of a substitution strategy during direct suppression so
as to ensure as ‘pure’ a measure of direct suppression was obtained to ensure
comparability with other TNT studies (Anderson and Green, 2001; Anderson et al.,
2004).
were recorded. As participants had learnt two memories for
some cues, they were given up to 2 min to recall both sets of
memories for these cues. Participants were again asked to rate
all of the original memories in terms of their perceived valence,
availability, imaginability, vividness, significance, and relatedness
(see Figure 1B).
Finally, participants were given a post-experimental thought
intrusions questionnaire in which they rated each of the no-
think items in the direct suppression and memory substitution
conditions. Participants were asked the degree to which they
focused on the word as it appeared on the screen; how difficult
they found it to ‘not think’ about the original memory associated
with the word; how often the (original) associated memory came
to mind; how often other thoughts (not including the alternative
or substitute memory generated in session one) came to mind
when the cue was presented and how often the second set (or
substitute) memories came to mind when the cue was presented.
Scoring and Behavioral Data Analysis
All the original memories were coded and scored using both
strict and gist criteria (Noreen and MacLeod, 2013). For the
strict criteria, a correct score was obtained if both descriptions
concerning the cause and the consequence(s) for each memory
were judged to correspond to the descriptions generated in
session 1, with only minor variations being accepted as being
correct. For the gist criteria, memories were scored as correct if
the memory descriptions could be identified as referring to the
same memories that were generated in the first session. A further
independent coder was used to validate both the coding and the
scoring by reading all the autobiographical memories from all
participants (660 memories in total). For the coding, there was
a high level of agreement between the two researchers (100%
agreement for the gist criteria; 96% agreement for strict criteria
overall; i.e., cause and consequence). Pearson correlations also
revealed a strong correlation between the strict scoring of the
memories by the two researchers [r(20)= 0.86, p < 0.01].
fMRI Acquisition and Analysis
Scanning was performed on a 3T Siemens Trio whole-body
MRI scanner (Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany)
using a standard 12-channel receive-only whole-head coil. On-
task functional data were acquired using a descending echo-
planar pulse sequence (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, 90◦
flip angle, 35 axial slices parallel to the AC–PC plane with
3.5 mm × 3.5 mm × 4 mm voxels, no inter-slice gap). Head
motion was minimized using foam padding. High-resolution
T1-, T2-, and FLAIR-weighted anatomical images were also
acquired for visualization. All BOLD data were processed
with SPM8. Slice acquisition timing correction was carried
out by temporally resampling relative to the middle slice
collected, followed by rigid body motion correction. Functional
volumes were then spatially normalized to a canonical echo-
planar template using 12-parameter affine and cosine basis
transformations, and resampled to 3 mm isotropic voxels.
Volumes were then spatially smoothed with a 6 mm Gaussian
kernel.
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Task-Evoked Univariate Analyses
Univariate analyses is the traditional method of rapid event-
related fMRI analysis in which participants are treated as a
random effect with volumes treated as a temporally correlated
time series. Summary amplitudes were modeled by convolving
a canonical hemodynamic response function with a series of
delta functions marking the onset of each condition of interest.
Trials were modeled as 4000 ms duration epochs from their
respective onsets (the period for which they were asked to follow
task instructions relating to the cue word). The best-fitting β
parameter estimates of the canonical hemodynamic response
function for each condition were used in pairwise contrasts and
stored as a separate image for each participant. These images
were tested against the null hypothesis of no difference between
contrast conditions using one-tailed, repeated measures t-tests.
Activations were considered significant and further scrutinized if
they consisted of five or more contiguous voxels and exceeded an
alpha threshold of 0.001 (typical threshold in memory research).
The two blocks consisting of ‘think’ and ‘no-think1’ trials
and the two blocks consisting of ‘memory substitution’ and
‘no-think2’ trials were modeled in the same GLM but with
separate beta parameter estimates for each condition according
to block (i.e. two separate ‘no-think’ beta parameter estimates
were made: ‘think-block no-think1,’ ‘memory substitution-block
no-think2’). Summary amplitudes were also modeled separately
for cause and consequence condition trials in both think and
memory substitution blocks. Where ‘no-think’ conditions were
contrasted with other active tasks, we restricted the no-think
trials used to only those from the blocks corresponding to the
active condition (e.g., the ‘think’ vs. ‘no-think1’ contrast used
summary amplitudes for the no-think condition calculated using
only no-think trials from blocks 1 and 2).
Region-of-Interest (ROI) Analyses
Region-of-interest (ROI) analyses were carried out to compare
estimates of task-evoked response amplitude following initial
exploration using univariate analyses. ROIs were defined as all
voxels within a cluster from a univariate contrast or all voxels
within a sphere of 5 mm diameter around a central coordinate,
and were generated using the MARSBAR toolbox for SPM8 (Brett
et al., 2002). We also used MARSBAR to extract each participant’s
average response amplitude for each condition modeled in the
GLM and then subjected these parameter estimates to standard
inferential statistical analyses.
Psychophysiological Interaction (PPI) Analyses
We conducted a psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis to
recover regions which selectively couple with an a priori defined
seed region according to conditions defined in the GLM. This
analysis was motivated by our hypothesis that increased activity
in the right DLPFC region would couple with the hippocampus
and exert a negative influence on hippocampal activation. For
each participant, we conducted a single PPI using eigenvariate
time series from the seed region centered on left posterior
hippocampus. These time series were extracted using the VOI
extraction function in SPM8 and then deconvolved with the
canonical HRF (Gitelman et al., 2003). They were then multiplied
by the psychological function (see below) and reconvolved with
the HRF to obtain the PPI interaction term using the PPI
function in SPM8. The PPI interaction terms were entered into
each participant’s GLM as regressors of interest. The participant-
level results were then taken to the random effects level in
order to test the on-task network decoupling prediction outlined
above.
Using a timecourse from the hippocampal seed as its
physiological term, the psychological function considered think
and no-think trials (e.g., set to −1 for think trials and +1
for no-think trials). The psychological function multipliers in
the described states would yield regions whose timecourses
were more correlated with the seed during no-think condition
trials than during think condition trials. In these analyses,
activations were considered significant and further scrutinized
if they consisted of five or more contiguous voxels and if they
exceeded an alpha threshold of 0.001.
RESULTS
Characteristics of Autobiographical
Memories
The mean ratings for the memories recalled regarding perceived
availability, imaginability, significance, valence, vividness, and
relatedness were each analyzed using a 2 (time; session 1 vs.
session 2) × 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) × 5 (instruction;
baseline vs. think vs. no-think1 vs. memory substitution vs.
no-think2) mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA). These
analyses revealed that there was no effect of time on availability,
F(2,41)= 2.28, p> 0.05 and relatedness, F(2,19)= 2.38, p> 0.05.
There was also no effect of time on imaginability, significance,
valence, and vividness; all tests F < 1.
In the remainder of this section, only significant effects
are reported. Consistent with Baumeister et al. (2001) who
suggest that negative memories have more impact than positive
memories, our findings revealed participants’ perceived negative
memories as being more significant to them than positive
memories, F(1,20) = 12.67, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.131 (M = 3.75,
SD = 1.07 vs. M = 3.0, SD = 0.89). Furthermore, our analyses
also revealed a significant time by valence effect, F(1,20)= 11.22,
p < 0.01, η2p = 0.118, with participants rating negative memories
as more negative in session one than session two (M = 5.31,
SD = 0.76 vs. M = 4.57, SD = 1.01); t(43) = 2.72, p < 0.01,
d = 0.83. There were no significant differences, however, in the
ratings of positive memories in sessions one and two (M = 2.09,
SD= 0.94 vs. M= 2.62, SD= 1.07); t(43)= 2.0, p> 0.05, d= 0.53
(see Table 1).
Response Latency
In order to determine whether there were any differences in
the mean latency for memories generated in session one, we
conducted a 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) × 5 (instruction:
baseline vs. think vs. no-think1 vs. memory substitution vs. no-
think2) mixed design ANOVA. Consistent with previous findings
obtained by Noreen and MacLeod (2013), there was no significant
effect of instruction; all tests F < 1.
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TABLE 1 | Showing mean ratings for characteristics of positive and
negative memories in session 1 and session 2.
Session 1 (mean and SD) Session 2 (mean and SD)
Positive Negative Positive Negative
Valence 2.09 (0.62) 5.31 (0.76) 2.61 (1.07) 4.57 (1.01)
Availability 2.51 (0.66) 2.76 (0.61) 2.74 (0.76) 3.0 (0.86)
Imaginability 2.56 (0.88) 2.71 (0.90) 2.64 (0.76) 2.92 (1.0)
Vividness 2.88 (0.93) 3.11 (0.85) 2.94 (0.73) 3.21 (0.94)
Significance 2.95 (0.94) 3.84 (1.06) 3.05 (0.85) 3.66 (1.10)
Relatedness 2.25 (0.53) 2.59 (0.66) 2.14 (0.64) 2.30 (0.65)
Memory Accuracy
Memory Accuracy using the Strict Criteria
In order to examine recall accuracy using the strict criteria, we
conducted a 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) × 5 (instruction:
baseline vs. think vs. no-think1 vs. memory substitution vs.
no-think2) mixed design ANOVA. This analysis revealed a
significant effect of instruction, F(5,16) = 15.79, p < 0.01,
η2p = 0.543 (see Figure 2). Subsequent pairwise analysis revealed
that participants recalled significantly more memories in the
think condition than in the never-presented baseline condition
(M = 79.55, SD= 20.61 vs. M= 65.15, SD= 17.54); t(21)= 3.77,
p < 0.01, d = 0.75. Participants also recalled significantly
fewer memories in the no-think conditions than in the baseline
condition (no-think1, M = 56.82, SD = 16.98 vs. M = 65.15,
SD = 17.54; no-think2, M = 56.06, SD = 18.71 vs. M = 65.15,
SD = 17.54); t(21) = 2.55, p < 0.02, d = 0.48, and t(21) = 2.61,
p < 0.01, d = 0.50, respectively. Also fewer memories were
recalled in the memory substitution condition than the baseline
condition (M = 53.03, SD = 18.07 vs. M = 65.15, SD = 17.54);
t(21) = 3.36, p < 0.01, d = 0.68. There was neither a significant
effect of valence nor an instruction by valence interaction, all tests
F < 1.
Memory Accuracy using the Gist Criteria
In order to examine recall accuracy using the gist criteria, we
conducted a 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) × 5 (instruction:
FIGURE 2 | Mean percentage of memories recalled as a function of
instruction type. Error bars represent +1 standard errors of the mean (SEM).
baseline vs. think vs. no-think1 vs. memory substitution vs. no-
think2) mixed design ANOVA. This analysis revealed neither
a significant effect of instruction, F(5,16) = 2.36, p > 0.05,
valence, F < 1, p > 0.05, nor an instruction by valence
interaction, F(5,16) = 1.47, p > 0.05. These findings are
consistent with Noreen and MacLeod (2013) and suggest that
although individuals may be successful at forgetting the details of
memories, they do not forget the memory of the event itself (for a
more detailed discussion on memory suppression using gist and
strict criteria see Noreen and MacLeod, 2013).
Thought Intrusions Questionnaire
Our analysis revealed that participants showed no significant
differences in the degree to which they focused on the cue words
in the direct suppression and the memory substitution conditions
during the autobiographical think/no-think phase (M = 4.19,
SD = 0.85 vs. M = 4.26, SD = 0.93); t(21) = 0.27, p > 0.05.
We also found that there were no significant differences in how
often the original associated memory came to mind in the direct
suppression and the memory substitution conditions (M = 2.28,
SD = 0.57 vs. M = 2.40, SD = 0.57); t(21) = 0.70, p > 0.05. We
did, however, find that participants expressed greater difficulty
in ‘not thinking’ about the original memory associated with the
cue word in the direct suppression than the memory substitution
condition (M = 2.90, SD = 0.98 vs. M = 2.24, SD = 0.87);
t(21) = 2.39, p < 0.05, d = 0.71. Furthermore, participants
also generated fewer alternative thoughts (not including the
alternative memory generated in session 1) and fewer of the
second set of memories in the direct suppression than the
memory substitution condition; (M = 2.24, SD = 0.38 vs.
M = 3.93, SD = 0.71); t(21) = 9.77, p > 0.01, d = 2.97; second
set of memories (M = 1.61, SD = 0.46 vs. M = 4.48, SD = 0.44);
t(21)= 21.45, p > 0.01, d = 6.38.
Neural Correlates of Memory Retrieval
and Suppression
The primary contrasts of interest were those showing differential
activation across think and no-think1 conditions. Given
the potential use of memory substitution as a strategy
when following non-specific suppression instructions, we also
examined activation differences across no-think2 and memory
substitution conditions.
We first sought to identify regions which were more
active under instructions to ‘think’ than to ‘not think’ about
memories associated with the cue words (think vs. no-think1).
Unsurprisingly, under this contrast there was a great deal of
activation (Table 2 shows local maxima from the major cluster;
Table 3 shows a summary of the remaining clusters; Figure 3A
renders the cortical activation on a canonical brain surface).
A vast swathe of visual cortex activation extended along the
midline and laterally into left parietal and temporal cortices.
There was also a large region of activation extending laterally
from the medial surface of left supplementary motor area to
the pars triangularis of the inferior frontal gyrus. Suprathreshold
subcortical structures included bilateral caudate and thalamus
and left posterior parahippocampal formation and left posterior
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TABLE 2 | Local maxima from the major cluster activated during the think vs. no-think1 contrast.
Region Lat. BA x y z Local maximum Z score
Occipital
Lingual gyrus L 18 −21 −79 −11 6.53
Calcarine sulcus L 17 0 −88 −5 6.02
Superior occipital gyrus L 17 −6 −103 10 5.96
R 18 21 −94 28 5.47
Cingulum R 26 9 −46 22 5.74
L 23 −6 −49 22 5.71
Mid occipital gyrus L 39 −39 −67 28 4.92
Calcarine sulcus R 17 6 −58 16 4.90
L 17 0 −97 1 5.55
Frontal
IFG L 45 −54 26 13 5.87
Precentral gyrus L 6 −45 2 46 5.15
SMA L 6 −3 17 61 5.13
MFG L 8 −33 14 58 4.81
Temporal
MTG L 21 −60 −46 −2 6.07
Fusiform R 18 24 −70 −11 5.91
Hippocampus L 30 −18 −28 −8 4.58
ITG L 20 −51 −19 −20 4.45
Parietal
SMG L 40 −36 −52 46 5.88
Precuneus L 7 −6 −70 40 5.86
R 23 21 −58 28 4.81
SPL L 7 −27 −61 46 4.46
Cerebellum
Posterior lobe R – 30 −73 −20 5.49
R – 24 −82 −17 4.93
Anterior lobe L – −18 −55 −14 4.80
Table summarizes local maxima within the major 13110 voxel cluster from the think vs. no-think contrast. Lat., laterality; BA, approximate Brodmann’s area; x, y, and z,
coordinates in MNI space. IFG, Inferior frontal gyrus; MFG, middle frontal gyrus; SPL, superior parietal lobule; SMG, supramarginal gyrus.
hippocampus. The opposite contrast (i.e., no-think1 vs. think)
yielded a much more restricted activation map comprising
one suprathreshold cluster in the right inferior parietal cortex
(28 voxels in right BA 40, with peak activation at MNI coordinates
[57, −55, 46]; not shown). Furthermore, we also conducted
separate contrasts for no-think1 vs. think trials in blocks 1 and
2 which also revealed a similar pattern of activation2.
We next sought to interrogate the differences in activation
across no-think2 and memory substitution conditions. The
memory substitution vs. no-think2 contrast yielded an activation
map very similar to that obtained in the think vs. no-think1
contrast (Table 4 shows local maxima from the major cluster;
Table 5 shows a summary of the remaining clusters; Figure 3B
renders the cortical activation on a canonical brain) whilst
the opposite contrast yielded no suprathreshold activations.
Within the memory substitution vs. no-think2 contrast, all of
2As we only has 288 critical trials with 6 × 12 trials per condition and previous
research has used trials in the order of 10 ∼ 15 × 12 trials per condition (Depue
et al., 2007; Benoit and Anderson, 2012) it was not possible to look at the imaging
data in terms of memory accuracy to determine whether the neural correlates of
suppression differed depending on suppression success.
the major cortical structures activated in the think vs. no-
think1 contrast were again activated in the memory substitution
contrast (though to a lesser extent, as evident in the decreased
cluster contiguity). There were, however, some differences
in the patterns of subcortical activity – decreased thalamus
and caudate activation alongside maintained bilateral posterior
parahippocampal and posterior hippocampal activations (local
maxima at [−24, −31, −14] in the left hemisphere, [24,
−28, −2] in the right). The correspondence in patterns of
activation suggests that bringing to mind a target memory
recruits support from a largely overlapping brain network to
that recruited by bringing to mind an alternative memory
using the same cue. Given that the major component of these
two tasks is the controlled retrieval and maintenance of an
autobiographical memory, this overlap in neural activation is
unsurprising.
We then examined the neural mechanisms by which
the behavioral consequences of autobiographical memory
suppression are enacted. Specifically, we wanted to establish
whether the results of the subtraction contrasts above was
brought about by activation in the think and memory substitution
conditions, or deactivation in the no-think1 and 2 conditions,
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TABLE 3 | Minor clusters activated during the think vs. no-think1 contrast.
Region Lat. BA x y z Vox. Cluster Z score
Frontal
OFC R 47 30 50 −5 17 3.94
L 11 −6 50 −17 23 3.76
R 11 18 32 −14 6 3.34
L 47 −39 50 −5 13 3.30
L 34 −24 32 −17 7 3.57
Operculum R 48 45 −7 19 18 3.92
SFG L 32 −12 53 28 44 3.89
Insula L 48 −33 −22 7 14 3.88
SMA R 32 12 11 49 5 3.19
Temporal
ITG R 20 51 −10 −26 91 4.21
MTG R 21 48 −34 −2 55 3.77
Parietal
Post-central sulcus R 3 42 −31 67 33 4.47
L 2 −39 −40 67 7 3.35
AG R 39 39 −64 34 8 3.35
Cerebellum
Anterior lobe R 20 30 −31 −29 22 3.81
Table summarizes the remaining clusters not detailed in table from the think vs. no-think contrast. Lat., laterality; BA, approximate Brodmann’s area; x, y, and z, coordinates
in MNI space; Vox., number of voxels within the cluster. OFC, Orbitofrontal cortex; SFG, superior frontal gyrus; SMA, supplementary motor area; ITG, inferior temporal
gyrus; MTG, medial temporal gyrus; AG, sngular gyrus.
or via a combination of both. We also wanted to compare the
activations obtained in this task to those reported in analogous
tasks. To accomplish these checks and comparisons, we extracted
the beta parameter and time course estimates from four ROIs (see
Figure 4): the first was a 40 voxel left hippocampal cluster derived
from the think vs. no-think1 threshold contrast thresholded at
a conservative p < 0.0001; the next three were 5 mm radius
spheres centered on right DLPFC [32, 38, 26] (BA 46), left caudal
PFC (cPFC) [−52, 9, 24] (BA 44/6) and left VLPFC [−50, 25,
14] (BA 45). These four ROI were selected because they have
previously been implicated in direct memory suppression and
memory substitution (Benoit and Anderson, 2012). Furthermore,
the DLPFC and the hippocampus regions have been robustly
implicated in the suppression of a variety of different materials,
including faces, words, and pictures, and therefore may also
be involved in the suppression of autobiographical memories
(Anderson et al., 2004; Depue et al., 2007; Benoit et al., 2014).
Repeated-measures comparisons of cause and consequence
amplitudes within the think and memory substitution conditions,
and no-think1 and no-think2 conditions (blocks 1–2 and blocks
3–4) yielded no significant differences, all ps > 0.10, so we
collapsed across these pairs of conditions within these analyses
(i.e., cause and consequence as well as no-think1 and no-think2).
This yielded three sets of beta amplitudes – think (blocks 1–
2), memory substitution (blocks 3–4), and no-think (blocks
1–4) – on which we conducted four repeated-measures one-
way ANOVAs (one per ROI). Figure 4 illustrates the ROIs
and the beta amplitudes recovered from them under each of
the conditions (note: no-think1 and no-think2 amplitudes are
shown separately in the figure). Within the hippocampal ROI
(Figure 4A), there was a significant difference in beta amplitudes
according to condition, F(2,20) = 13.21, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.386.
Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed significant
differences between the no-think condition (M = −0.06,
SD = 0.12), and both think (M = 0.19, SD = 0.29), and
memory substitution conditions (M = 0.19, SD = 0.29); both
ps < 0.001. There was no significant difference in hippocampal
response between the think and memory substitution conditions,
p = 1.00. Given the finding in the literature that memory
suppression is associated with hippocampal deactivation, we
also conducted a single-sample t-test which revealed that
the hippocampal response during the no-think condition was
indeed significantly below baseline, t(21) = −2.31, p = 0.031,
d = 0.637.
There were no significant differences in amplitude within
the right DLPFC (Figure 4B), or the left cPFC (Figure 4C),
F(2,42) = 1.82, p = 0.174, η2p = 0.080, and F < 1,
respectively. However, there was a significant difference across
conditional amplitude responses in the left VLPFC (Figure 4D),
F(2,20) = 15.26, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.421. As with the
left hippocampus, Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons
showed significant differences between the no-think condition
(M = −0.06, SD = 0.14), and both think (M = 0.14, SD = 0.17),
and memory substitution conditions (M = 0.15, SD = 0.20);
both ps < 0.001, with no significant difference between the think
and memory substitution conditions, p = 1.00. The VLPFC
response during the no-think condition was not significantly
below 0, t(21) = −2.01, p = 0.057, d = 0.430. These results are
consistent with previous findings that demonstrate a significant
deactivation in the hippocampus during the suppression of
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FIGURE 3 | Regions of activation in the think/memory substitution vs. no-think1 and 2 contrasts. (A) Regions demonstrating significant activation in the
think vs. no-think1 contrast. (B) Regions demonstrating significant activation in the memory substitution vs. no-think2 contrast. Images in both panels are
thresholded at p < 0.001 with clusters comprising a minimum of five contiguous voxels. In both panels, the sagittal slice is marked with an L indicating the side of
the left hemisphere and is rendered where x = −5. The coronal slice is rendered at y = −28.
memories (Anderson et al., 2004; Benoit et al., 2014). More
surprisingly, perhaps, the right DLPFC (a region associated with
the exertion of cognitive control during this task; see Anderson
et al., 2004; Depue et al., 2007; Benoit and Anderson, 2012; Levy
and Anderson, 2012; Paz-Alonso et al., 2013) did not demonstrate
elevated responses under no-think instructions, whilst the left
cPFC and the VLPFC regions, which have both previously
found to show elevated responses during memory substitution
(Benoit and Anderson, 2012) also failed to demonstrate condition
selectivity in their responding.
Individual Differences in Forgetting
Given our finding that left hippocampal deactivation occurs
during the no-think condition, we investigated whether the
degree of hippocampal deactivation was associated with
a behavioral outcome. Specifically, we hypothesized that
individuals who were successful at forgetting would show greater
hippocampal deactivation, operationalised as more negative
beta amplitudes from the previously defined left hippocampal
ROI, than individuals unsuccessful at forgetting. We classified
participants as being either successful or unsuccessful at
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TABLE 4 | Local maxima from the major cluster activated during the memory substitution vs. no-think2 contrast.
Region Lat. BA x y z Local maximum Z score
Occipital
Lingual gyrus L 18 −27 −85 −14 5.71
R 18 24 −85 −14 5.18
Precuneus L 23 −6 −61 19 5.40
R 29 9 −49 19 5.36
Cuneus R 17 12 −97 10 5.69
Calcarine sulcus L 17 −3 −85 −11 5.43
Superior occipital gyrus L 17 −9 −103 10 5.26
R 18 21 −91 31 4.90
Inferior occipital gyrus L 19 −42 −82 −11 4.45
R 19 42 −82 −14 4.63
Mid occipital gyrus L 7 −33 −67 40 5.08
R 19 36 −79 10 3.79
Cingulum L 23 −6 −49 34 4.80
Temporal
Fusiform L 37 −42 −58 −17 5.15
R 19 27 −76 −8 5.02
MTG L 21 −57 −43 −5 4.64
Parahippocampus L 30 −24 −31 −14 4.60
Parietal
Precuneus L 7 −9 −67 37 5.10
SMG L 40 −36 −52 37 5.08
Cingulum R 23 0 −31 34 4.92
SPL R 7 27 −76 49 4.14
Precuneus R 23 18 −61 31 3.82
Cerebellum
Anterior lobe R 19 30 −76 −17 5.46
Posterior lobe L 18 −15 −82 −23 4.50
Table summarizes local maxima within the major 9078 voxel cluster from the memory substitution vs. no-think contrast. Lat., laterality; BA, approximate Brodmann’s area;
x, y, and z, coordinates in MNI space. MTG, Middle temporal gyrus; SMG, supramarginal gyrus; SPL, superior parietal lobule.
TABLE 5 | Minor clusters activated during the memory substitution vs. no-think2 contrast.
Region Lat. BA x y z Vox. Cluster Z score
Frontal
OFC L 47 −39 29 −14 84 3.94
L 11 −24 35 −17 10 3.65
SFG L 10 −24 62 13 14 3.64
Operculum R 44 57 17 37 6 3.53
MFG L 46 −39 53 7 7 3.41
SMA L 6 −3 14 58 332 4.94
Precentral gyrus R 6 48 8 52 27 3.59
L 6 −45 2 49 550 4.94
Temporal
MTG L 21 −57 −4 −17 71 4.23
Fusiform L 20 −36 −16 −32 12 3.55
Brainstem – – −0 −37 −50 65 3.61
Table summarizes the remaining clusters not detailed in Table 4 from the memory substitution vs. no-think contrast. Lat., laterality; BA, approximate Brodmann’s area;
x, y, and z, coordinates in MNI space, Vox., number of voxels within the cluster. OFC, Orbitofrontal cortex; SFG, superior frontal gyrus; MFG, middle frontal gyrus; SMA,
supplementary motor area; MTG, medial temporal gyrus.
suppression based upon their recall performance on the
final test. Successful suppressors were defined as individuals
who demonstrated below-baseline forgetting on the final
test, whereas unsuccessful suppressors were defined as
individuals who had demonstrated equivalent or enhanced
recall of memories associated with no-think cue words (in
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FIGURE 4 | Four ROIs and their beta amplitude responses. Illustrations of the ROIs in red (left) and their beta amplitude responses to think, memory
substitution, no-think1 and no-think2 (right) are shown for (A) left hippocampus, derived from a cluster within the think vs. threshold contrast thresholded at
p < 0.0001, and 5 mm radius spheres centered on (B) right DLPFC [32, 38, 26], (C) left caudal PFC (cPFC) [−52, 9, 24] and (D) left VLPFC [−50, 25, 14] (BA 45).
Error bars represent +1 SEM.
comparison to baseline). This resulted in 15 individuals who
were successful at suppression and seven individuals who were
unsuccessful at suppression. Pairwise analysis revealed that
hippocampal response amplitudes were significantly lower
for those individuals successful at forgetting (M = −0.12,
SD = 0.09) than those individuals unsuccessful at forgetting
(M = 0.05, SD = 1.0; t(21) = 3.68, p < 0.01, d = 1.68).
There was no significant correlation, however, between
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hippocampal activation and the extent of forgetting, r(22)= 0.17,
p > 0.05.
Selective Coupling of Activation with Left
Posterior Hippocampus
The findings presented so far suggest that deactivation in the left
posterior hippocampal region may be associated with successful
suppression of autobiographical memories. In spite of this,
interrogation of a priori defined ROIs in the PFC failed to show
a corresponding elevation in activation during no-think trials.
As an alternative approach, we therefore searched for regions
which might selectively engage with hippocampus during no-
think trials whilst disengaging during think trials. To this end,
we conducted a PPI analysis with the seed a 4 mm radius
sphere centered on MNI coordinates [−21, −28, −8], a region
of activation in left posterior hippocampus from the original
think vs. no-think contrast which, on examination of amplitudes,
was found to be driven by both think activation and no-think
deactivation.
This analysis revealed a number of regions which selectively
couple with the hippocampal seed during no-think trials and
decouple during think trials (see Figure 5; Table 6). Besides
those in occipital cortex and cerebellum, activations of note were
present in left lateral parietal cortex, fusiform, and insular cortex.
Notable absences of activation at this thresholding included the
regions of cortex in the right hemisphere and lateral and medial
prefrontal cortex. The exact relationship of the selectively coupled
regions with hippocampus is unclear, although the rationale
by which they have been recovered is indicative of greater
engagement during suppress instructions (which are associated
with deactivation in left posterior hippocampus) than during
response instructions (associated with hippocampal activation).
DISCUSSION
The aim of our study was to identify the mechanisms
associated with the suppression of meaningful and emotional
autobiographical memories using the autobiographical think/no-
think task (Noreen and MacLeod, 2013, 2014). Our behavioral
findings indicated that, participants demonstrated comparable
forgetting effects in the no-think (direct suppression) and the
memory substitution conditions. These findings are consistent
with a growing body of research which has demonstrated that,
although individuals may use different strategies to prevent the
unwanted memory from coming to mind, similar forgetting
effects can be produced on tests which use the same cue to
retrieve the unwanted memory (Bergström et al., 2009; Benoit
and Anderson, 2012).
Despite demonstrating a forgetting effect in the no-think
condition, however, we found no greater activation in the
DLPFC during suppression. This finding is inconsistent with
other studies which have found that direct suppression involves
a highly demanding DLPFC-driven controlled process which
overrides hippocampal retrieval (Anderson et al., 2004; Depue
et al., 2007; Knoch and Fehr, 2007; Lieberman, 2007; Benoit
et al., 2014; Gagnepain et al., 2014). Importantly, our finding is
consistent with Hu et al. (2015) who examined the consequences
of suppression instructions on autobiographical memories for
a mock crime. Despite the fact that N200 is acknowledged to
be sensitive to suppression and has been found to be predictive
of successful forgetting (Bergström et al., 2009; Mecklinger
et al., 2009), no frontal N200 activity was evident. Taken
together, these findings may indicate that the suppression of
autobiographical memories do not rely on the same pattern of
fronto-hippocampal activation as the suppression of other less
complex memories.
Interestingly, our findings also revealed a reduction in
hippocampal activity during direct suppression. Consistent
with reduced hippocampal activation being associated with
increased suppression, we found that there was significantly
lower hippocampal BOLD signal in those who were successful at
suppressing unwanted memories compared to those that failed
to show a forgetting effect. These particular findings provide
partial support for the idea that there is reduced hippocampal
activation during direct suppression (Anderson et al., 2004;
Benoit and Anderson, 2012) and is consistent with the view that
the hippocampus plays a key role in the retrieval (or not) of both
personally meaningful and more abstract memoranda.
One possible reason for the absence of increased DLPFC
activation in the no-think condition in the present study may
relate to strategy use. In our study, all participants were given
FIGURE 5 | Regions which show a no-think-couple/think-decouple relationship with left posterior hippocampus. Results of a whole-brain PPI analysis
using a 4 mm sphere centered on MNI coordinates [−21, −28, −8]. Regions highlighted couple with the seed region during the no-think condition and decouple
during the think condition. Images are thresholded at p < 0.001 with clusters comprising a minimum of five contiguous voxels.
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TABLE 6 | Regions which show a no-think-couple/think-decouple relationship with left posterior hippocampus.
Region Lat. BA x y z Vox. Cluster Z score
Occipital
Calcarine sulcus R 17 24 55 16 26 4.34
L 17/18 −21 67 19 56 3.92
R 18 9 −73 19 5 3.28
Cuneus R 18 12 −88 16 10 3.57
Temporal
Fusiform L 37 −33 −46 17 19 4.25
Parietal
SMG L 2 −63 25 37 18 3.79
AG L 39 −45 64 22 5 3.33
Cerebellum
Anterior lobe L – −9 −40 50 8 3.72
Frontal
Insula L 48 −39 13 4 8 3.56
Lat., laterality, BA, approximate Brodmann’s area; x, y, and z, coordinates in MNI space, Vox., number of voxels within the cluster. SMG, Supramarginal gyrus; AG, angular
gyrus.
both direct suppression and memory substitution strategies to
use during the ATNT phase. Thus, it is possible that participants
may have used a combination of both strategies in each condition
thereby contaminating our results with uncontrolled memory
substitution in the no-think condition. It is important to mention
here, however, that participants were only given the direct
suppression strategy to use in the first two blocks of our study,
thus mirroring the original task and representing as pure a
measure of direct suppression as possible. The fact that we failed
to find any significant differences between this ‘pure’ measure (as
indexed by the first two ‘no-think’ blocks) and the potentially
‘contaminated’ measure of direct suppression (as indexed by
the latter two ‘no-think’ blocks) – specifically, no increased
activation in the DLPFC in the ‘pure’ no-think condition –
would suggest that any cross-contamination of strategy use was
minimal and therefore unlikely to have been a factor in explaining
the contrast between the presents study and other related TNT
studies.
A more plausible reason as to why our study did not find
increased DLPFC activation for the ‘no-think’ trials in the direct
suppression condition may be a function of having tapped into
a different aspect of memory inhibition. The forgetting effects
observed in our study are inherently different from those studies
that have looked at suppression effects for other relatively simple
stimuli such as words, pictures, or faces (Anderson et al., 2004;
Depue et al., 2007; Benoit and Anderson, 2012; Benoit et al.,
2014). Suppression effects in previous studies, for instance, have
reflected impairment in the recollection of the unwanted target
item on a subsequent memory test following suppression. In
our study, in contrast, participants were unimpaired in their
ability to recall the memory of the event itself but, rather, showed
systematic forgetting effects for details associated with these
memories. Thus, the form of forgetting for autobiographical
memory may be much more subtle in its effects and may
be related to the quality and specificity of the unwanted
memory.
It is established that autobiographical memories are often
emotional, vivid and rich with information and layers of varying
complexity (Conway, 2001). Given the complex nature of these
memories, it is possible that these memories comprise a number
of components which may be differentially susceptible to the
effects of suppression. Furthermore, given that we have found
different observable effects of suppression for autobiographical
memories – namely, forgetting effects for the details of these
memories rather than the entire unwanted memory itself, it
is possible that this form of suppression taxes control-related
regions to a differing extent. Thus, the specific pattern of
activation recruited in the frontal control related regions may
vary according to task demands.
It is also possible that our failure to find DLPFC activation
during suppression may be due to the fact that our trials
contained a combination of both memories that were successfully
suppressed and those that were unsuccessfully forgotten.
Thus, it is possible that combining correct and incorrect
suppression trials averaged out the effect that may have
only been present for incorrect trials. It is important to
mention, however, that we did look at individual differences in
neural activation between successful suppressors (i.e., those that
demonstrated below-baseline forgetting on the final test) and
unsuccessful suppressors (i.e., those that showed equivalent or
enhanced recall of memories relative to baseline recall). Overall,
our findings revealed that although hippocampal response
amplitudes were significantly lower for successful individuals
than those individuals unsuccessful at forgetting, there was no
difference in response amplitudes in the DLPFC. Furthermore,
there was also no significant correlation between DLPFC
activation and the size of the forgetting effect observed.
One notable strength of our study was that we used a within-
subjects design. This allowed us to make a direct comparison
between brain activation for the same individuals during
direct suppression and memory substitution. This is especially
important given that previous research has found that there are
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 15 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 379
fpsyg-07-00379 March 18, 2016 Time: 15:50 # 16
Noreen et al. Neural Correlates of Suppressing Autobiographical Memories
individual differences in the extent to which people can effectively
suppress unwanted memories, with some individuals showing
larger forgetting effects than others (Levy and Anderson, 2002;
Noreen and MacLeod, 2013, 2014). As participants generated two
sets of memories for the cue words in the first session, however,
this opens up the possibility that interference from the irrelevant
memory set may have occurred during direct suppression trials.
It is important to mention here that participants were asked in
the post-experimental questionnaire as to how often the second
set of memories came to mind. This revealed that participants
reported having experienced very little recall of the second set
of memories during direct suppression (mean rating was 1.61
with 1 = never coming to mind and 5 = always coming to
mind).
Our study also found that suppression in the no-think
condition was associated with increased activation in the inferior
parietal cortex. The inferior parietal region has already been
implicated in memory retrieval (Wagner et al., 2005; Cabeza
and St Jacques, 2007; Skinner and Fernandes, 2007; Ciaramelli
et al., 2008; Vilberg and Rugg, 2008; O’Connor et al., 2010)
and, more recently, research has explored how responses within
the parietal region are modulated by task goals. Gimbel and
Brewer (2014), for example, found that the parietal cortex (BA 40)
showed increased activity (from baseline) during recall and direct
suppression, thereby suggesting that the parietal lobe is highly
sensitive to retrieval success, but only under conditions where
retrieval has been attempted, with direct suppression abolishing
any retrieval success.
Increased activity in the inferior parietal region has also
been associated with action stopping (Aron et al., 2007; Swick
et al., 2011) with inferior parietal regions appearing to mediate
performance on tasks which require the inhibition of a motor
response (Rubia et al., 2001). The fact that the parietal region
has been implicated in both memory suppression and motor
suppression is consistent with an inhibitory framework which
suggests that the suppression of items from memory and motor
stopping engage a common neural architecture, and that the
apparent overlap between memory and motor systems means
that one could expect to find generalized inhibitory control
deficits in the population (Anderson, 2005; Levy and Anderson,
2008; Anderson and Weaver, 2009; Anderson and Huddleston,
2011). Clearly, further research is needed to fully understand the
role of the inferior parietal cortex in the direct suppression of
autobiographical memories.
Our findings also revealed that there was no increased
activation in the cPFC and the VLPFC during memory
substitution in comparison to the no-think condition. These
findings are inconsistent with previous findings by Benoit and
Anderson (2012) who reported increased cPFC and mid VLPFC
activity during memory substitution. One reason why these
regions did not demonstrate increased activity in the memory
substitution condition in our study may relate to the fact that
participants were asked to learn the substitute memory (instead
of thinking about the originally associated memory) prior to
scanning, which may have diminished competition between the
original and substitute memory. Alternatively, it is possible that
the lack of activity in the VLPFC may relate to the associative
nature of autobiographical memory. The VLPFC is involved
in the resolution of competition among multiple retrieved
representations in memory and enables selected representations
to guide decision and action (Badre and Wagner, 2007; Wimber
et al., 2008). Given that autobiographical memory consists of a
plethora of constructed memories, each containing event-specific
knowledge with many associative connections between features,
it is possible that, even under the direct suppression condition,
the presentation of the cue word may have provided associative
links to other memories. Thus, it is possible that cue words may
not have been sufficiently distinct to discriminate a memory from
alternatives.
It is important to mention here that one potential limitation
of our study is the lack of trials used in the ATNT phase of
our experiment. We had 288 critical trials with 6 × 12 trials
per condition, whilst previous research has used in the order of
10 ∼ 15 × 12 trials per condition (Depue et al., 2007; Benoit
and Anderson, 2012). Thus, it is possible that the apparent
lack of an effect in the PFC could have been a function of
low power. Whilst we accept this is a possibility, it remains
unclear as to why our behavioral results have shown a successful
forgetting effect whilst our neuroimaging results failed to find
successful PFC activation. If suppression is indeed a result
of a direct suppression mechanism, with DLPFC disengaging
retrieval processes supported by the hippocampus then we could
have expected DLPFC activation given the observed behavioral
forgetting effect.
Another limitation to the current study is the fact that
participants were asked in the first session to initially generate
two memories for each cue word. Thus, it is possible that
participants may not have engaged in direct suppression but
may have used a memory substitution strategy instead and
alternative memories that had been generated to prevent
the target memory from coming to mind. Again, whilst we
cannot rule out this possibility, it is important to note that we
used real-life autobiographical memories which individuals
had personally experienced. Autobiographical memory is
acknowledged to be highly associative in nature, with generic
cues often triggering multiple associated memories. Thus,
while our study deviates from other suppression studies in
this respect, the present study arguably provides a more
realistic depiction of how suppression may actually operate in
real-life.
The fact that we used ecologically valid memories of
events that had occurred in individuals’ lives and used
potent reminders to elicit these memories may ultimately
help us to understand how memory control works in daily
life, and thereby inform our understanding of clinical
conditions. For instance, it is possible that by successfully
suppressing some of the details associated with an unpleasant
memory, it may be possible to gradually weaken that memory
which may, in turn, help to reduce some of the associated
painful emotions. This suppression process may also enable
individuals to remember the event itself, which may have some
associated adaptive value while promoting the loss of some
of the more painful or distressing details associated with the
trauma.
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CONCLUSION
Our findings revealed that, while participants demonstrated
a forgetting effect in the no-think condition, they did
not demonstrate greater activation in the DLPFC during
direct suppression. Our findings, however, showed reduced
hippocampal activation for those individuals who were successful
at suppression, in comparison to those individuals who failed to
demonstrate a successful forgetting effect. This finding suggests
that direct suppression on hippocampal activity can disrupt
a memory by impairing the quality and the specificity of it,
even when the event itself remains accessible in memory. Our
findings also revealed that direct suppression was associated
with greater activation in the right inferior parietal region. This
region has recently been implicated in direct suppression and
motor stopping, providing support for the notion that memory
stopping and motor stopping may engage in a common neural
architecture. Finally, despite finding a forgetting effect in the
memory substitution condition, we failed to find increased
activation in the cPFC and VLPFC regions. It is clear from
our findings that the suppression of autobiographical memory
may require a much more nuanced approach if we are to fully
understand how we keep particular autobiographical memories
from coming to mind.
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